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FIRE & WATER
Technologies, Institutions, and Social Issues in
Arms Control and Transbounary Water-Resources
Agreements
By Elizabeth L. Chalecki, Peter H. Gleick, Kelli L. Larson, Arian L. Pregenzer,
and Aaron T. Wolf
The world of environmental security is bringingthe science of natural resources in ever-closercontact with the policy issues of international
stability and foreign affairs. Many U.S. and international
agencies—including the U.S. Departments of State and
Defense, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
the Southern African Development Community—
now analyze foreign policy in part through the lens of
environmental resources. In October 2001, three
organizations—the Pacific Institute for Studies in
Development, Environment, and Secur ity; the
Department of Geosciences of Oregon State University;
and the Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at
Sandia National Laboratories—sponsored a workshop
designed to highlight the closeness of national security
and environmental concerns through explicitly
comparing the technologies, institutions, and social
issues in two seemingly disparate fields: arms control
and transboundary water resources. With generous
support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York,
“Fire & Water” workshop participants compared and
contrasted these two fields and then identified
questions for further analysis. Workshop sessions
focused on three specific topics: (a) scientific and
technological advances, (b) treaties and institutions,
and (c) social and cultural issues.
Elizabeth L. Chalecki is the research associate for the Environment & Security Program at the Pacific Institute for
Studies in Development, Environment, and Security. She is currently working on issues of environmental terrorism,
climate change and its effects on U.S. security, and regional watershed security and diplomacy.
Peter H. Gleick is co-founder and president of the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and
Security. He is an internationally recognized expert on global freshwater resources, including the hydrologic impacts
of climate change, sustainable water use, privatization and globalization, and international conflicts over water
resources.
Kelli L. Larson is a doctoral student in the Geography Program at the Department of Geosciences, Oregon State
University. Her research interests relate to human dimensions of water-resources management and planning.
Arian L. Pregenzer is senior scientist at the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories in
Albuquerque, NM. Her responsibilities include leading the labs’ Regional Security Program with a focus on the
Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia.
Aaron T. Wolf is an associate professor of geography in the Department of Geosciences at Oregon State University.
His research focuses on the interaction between water science and water policy, particularly as related to conflict
prevention and resolution. He also coordinates the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, an electronic
compendium of case studies of water conflicts and conflict resolution, international treaties, national compacts, and
indigenous methods of water-dispute resolution (www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu).
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SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
These two fields are fundamentally different in
their structure and outlook. The arms-control regime
deals with a man-made, artificial resource and has states
as its main players. Its significance is political and
military, and the somewhat arbitrary rules and norms
that have grown up around this regime have meaning
only to other players in the regime (e.g., a treaty limit
that states that 5,000 missiles make a nation secure but
4,999 do not defines security only subjectively). The
water-resources regime, on the other hand, deals with
a natural resource that has paramount ecological and
cultural significance. The main players in the water
regime can be states, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), or individual citizens. More importantly,
there is a true and objective need for 50 liters of fresh
water per person per day (Gleick, 1998) as a
component of human security.
Nevertheless, both water-resources management
and arms control can be the subject of intense
international negotiations, and both require a
willingness to cooperate and perhaps to make short-
term sacrifices to gain long-term benefits. Negotiators
for both types of regimes need a general understanding
of the initial conditions (e.g., average water-flow or
-use data; general military capability) as a critical
foundation. Negotiations in both fields must address
topics such as lack of trust and/or data, transparency
versus opaqueness in process, and appropr iate
feedback loops and conflict-resolution mechanisms.
Conference participants also explored areas where
actors in each field might be able to learn from the
other. For example, arms-control agreements rely
heavily on the use of modern technologies such as
remote sensing and real-time monitoring. Water-
resources agreements have not traditionally applied
these types of technology, but could benefit greatly
from the objective data they provide. The arms-control
regime strives to induce every country to sign the same
agreements as a way of promoting universality of
international norms. Water treaties, however, involve
only those countries that contain part of the disputed
watershed, often resulting in innovative regional
solutions. Finally, the water regime has offered far more
opportunities for public participation through
professional organizations and NGOs than has the
arms-control regime. Military secrecy regarding arms
information and state sensitivity to revealing national
security matters has made arms-control agreements
generally weak in official opportunities for civic
participation.
INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES 101
Two hundred sixty-one watersheds cross the
political boundaries of two or more countries. These
international basins cover a portion of the earth’s surface
nearly equal to half of the earth’s land. They affect
about 40 percent of the world’s population and account
for approximately 60 percent of global river flow (Wolf
et al., 1999). Certain conditions make management of
these basins especially difficult—most notably, regional
politics that tend to exacerbate the already difficult
task of understanding and managing complex natural
systems.
Disparities between riparian nations (i.e., those
containing a freshwater boundary)—whether in
economic development, infrastructural capacity, or
political or ientation—further complicate water-
resources development, institutions, and management.
As a consequence, many people dealing with this
regime view treaties and institutions as inefficient,
ineffective, and occasionally yet another source of
fr iction. Despite the tensions inherent in the
international setting, however, riparians have shown
tremendous creativity in approaching regional
development, often through preventive diplomacy.
Generalized legal principles for transboundary
water management are currently defined by the
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, which was ratified by the
UN General Assembly in 1997 (International
Watercourses, 1997). The convention took several
decades to develop, highlighting the difficulty of
combining legal and hydrologic intricacies. Although
the convention provides many important principles
(including responsibility for cooperation and joint
management), it is also vague and occasionally
contradictory. To date, only a handful of water
negotiations and treaties have explicitly invoked these
pr inciples. The Convention offers few practical
guidelines for water allocations—the central issue in
most conflicts over water.
In the absence of detailed water law, adequate
institutional capacity, or warfare, the countries that
contain or border the world’s international waterways
have managed to “muddle through,” creating
remarkably cooperative water institutions in the
process. In contrast with more general international
conventions and pr inciples, these institutions—
including bilateral and multilateral agreements,
transboundary-management institutions, and unofficial
arrangements—have successfully focused on specific
regional conditions and concerns.
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The Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) has identified more than 3,600
treaties negotiated between A.D. 805 and 1984 relating
to international water resources. (The majority of these
treaties deal with some aspect of navigation). Since
1814, nations have also negotiated a smaller body of
treaties that address non-navigational issues of water
management—including flood control, hydropower
projects, and allocations for consumptive or non-
consumptive uses. The Transboundary Freshwater
Dispute Database Project at Oregon State University1
houses the largest collection of water-related treaties,
including the full text of about 300 treaties that deal
with water resources per se. Figure 1 shows the world’s
international basins, along with the number of treaties
might have been signed in each.
Despite their rich history, a reading of these treaties
reveals that the legal management of transboundary
rivers remains in its conceptual infancy. More than
half of these treaties lack monitoring provisions;
perhaps as a consequence, two-thirds fail to delineate
specific allocations, and four-fifths have no
enforcement mechanism. Moreover, the treaties that
do address allocations assign a fixed amount to all
riparian nations but one, and that one nation must
then accept the balance of the river flow, regardless of
fluctuations. Finally, multilateral basins are (almost
without exception) governed by bilateral treaties,
precluding the integrated basin management long
advocated by water managers. Nevertheless, once
treaties establish cooperative water regimes, they prove
impressively resilient over time—even between
otherwise hostile riparians and even as conflict wages
over other issues.
ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION
TREATIES 101
Arms-control and nonproliferation treaties—such
as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—are
legally binding agreements negotiated between states
(CWC, 1993; NPT, 1970). In the United States, the
President is authorized to sign a treaty, but the treaty
will not become law until the Senate has given its
advice and consent. In many cases, international
organizations manage treaty implementation and
perform monitor ing and ver ification activities.
However, these international organizations do not
make decisions about treaty compliance. While
verification involves information collection and oversight
activities to ensure compliance with treaty obligations,
national governments reserve the r ight to make
compliance decisions (i.e., whether treaty obligations
have actually been violated).
Most arms-control and nonproliferation treaties
have several basic elements, including three critical
Figure 1. Number of Treaties per
International Basin
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components: obligations, declarations, and verification
measures:
• Treaty obligations are the terms of the treaty. For
example, the CWC obligates countr ies not to
produce or stockpile chemical weapons. The
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) require
the United States and Russia to reduce the number
of deployed nuclear warheads. And nuclear testing
treaties obligate the parties to refrain from
atmospher ic nuclear weapons tests and from
underground tests above a particular yield.
• Declarations are the requirements on treaty parties to
disclose information relevant to the treaty’s terms
about their existing capabilities. For example, a treaty
may require parties to declare quantities and
locations of weapons, test facilities, and weapon
production facilities.
• Verification measures are activities and procedures to
determine the accuracy of declarations and to verify
that parties meet their obligations under the treaty.
Depending on the treaty, verification can include
the use of satellite imagery, on-site inspections,
unattended monitoring, and aer ial overflights.
Negotiators agree on ver ification measures
(including exact monitoring procedures, specific
technologies, and the methods for managing data)
in the actual treaty, making them difficult to change
even as new capabilities become available. These
measures can be highly contentious, even within a
specific country. Because all parties have the same
rights of verification and inspection, tradeoffs must
be made between intrusive ver ification and
protecting sensitive information. In addition, some
countries may agree to treaty membership and/or
verification measures as a quid pro quo—in exchange
for receiving technical assistance or other benefits.
Whereas signatory states generally implement
bilateral treaties, international organizations implement
many multilateral treaties. Examples include: (a) the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) associated
with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and (b) the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
for the CWC. Responsibilities for these international
organizations include: organizing and conducting
verification activities, managing and analyzing data
collected during verification, and recommending
measures to ensure compliance in suspicious
circumstances. As mentioned previously, these
organizations do not make compliance decisions.
SYNTHESIS 101
The Sandia workshop’s goals were (a) to explore
each field in the context of the changing definition of
security, and (b) to identify useful lessons and tools
each set of actors might explore further. Military
secur ity—and arms control in particular—has
traditionally viewed the state as the object of security.
The consequences of compliance and failure redound
onto the state. Water treaties, on the other hand, are
often negotiated from the premise that the object of
security is no longer solely the state, but includes the
people of the state. With almost 3,600 water-related
treaties, the water world has a more robust institutional
history. Only several dozen arms-control treaties exist,
and these have been assessed primarily against classic
security parameters.
Yet each regime—arms control and water-
resources management—deals with similar issues. A
detailed comparison of these two seemingly unrelated
fields can illuminate better methods of achieving both
state and human security. The similarities are striking,
and could lead to the successful transfer of technologies
and methodologies from one field to the other. Both
water management or water allocation and arms
control represent interstate issues negotiated between
governments; and successful agreements require both
an understanding of national and international politics
and an atmosphere of cooperation. Both sets of actors
negotiate around topics such as lack of trust and/or
data, transparency versus opaqueness in process, and
appropriate feedback loops and conflict-resolution
mechanisms.
The differences, however, are equally striking:
water is a shared resource, and water-resources treaties
generally involve geographically contiguous states that
share an international watershed. Arms are not a shared
resource, so arms-control agreements involve states
that are not necessarily contiguous. Water management
involves resource control and conflicts at the sub-
national level, whereas arms of the kind regulated by
international agreement have not generally been
available to sub-national groups or the public.
However, this last point may be changing with the
efforts of terrorist groups to obtain biological and
chemical weapons.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS
Summary
Both arms-control agreements and water
agreements must start with a clear and shared
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understanding of the definition of the relevant items
or resources. Both must also specify monitor ing
procedures and verification measures as an integral
part of the agreement. However, arms control and
water differ markedly in their use of technology for
monitoring and verification. Arms-control treaties
generally call for extensive use of technology and only
allow organizations identified in the treaty to engage
in monitoring. Water treaties, on the other hand,
generally prescribe neither types of technology nor
how the technology will be used to monitor
compliance.
Definitions
Establishing and clar ifying agreed-upon
definitions for terms at the outset of both water
and arms-control negotiations can prevent
misunderstandings and disagreements throughout the
negotiation process and beyond. Successful agreements
also require accurate baseline “capabilities and
facilities” data. For arms-control negotiations, this refers
to the best information possible on each nation’s
weapons stockpiles and production capabilities. For
water negotiations, this can include information on
yearly hydrological flows, water-usage data, and water-
quality and -quantity information. However, the
inherent seasonal and yearly fluctuations in such water
data can prove problematic for agreement negotiations.
For this reason, water agreements need flexible
baselines that can adapt to changing water conditions
in the signatory countries.
Verification
Verification is the most critical issue for a successful
treaty in either regime, and must be recognized as an
integral part of negotiations from the beginning. In
addition, the difference between “monitor ing”
(gathering data on water quality, weapons locations,
etc.), “verification” (determining whether a treaty
obligation has been met), and “compliance” (deciding
whether a party has violated the agreement) is
important, because political considerations play a
significant role in determining compliance.
Importantly, while technological measures,
inspections, and other intelligence-gathering methods
can greatly increase a state’s monitoring capability,
merely collecting data does not usually suffice for
verification. In arms control, verification decisions
usually fall to a political or executive body (such as
the State Department or Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
within individual countr ies. For both regimes, a
determination of non-compliance does not
automatically mean that a country will be charged with
a violation. In each case, political, economic, and other
considerations intervene.
Negotiating ver ification is usually the most
contentious point for governments, who may hesitate
to surrender any part of their national sovereignty to
intrusive inspections. The fluctuating baseline issue in
the water regime complicates this reluctance, since in
years of drought it may be impossible to comply with
a treaty based on fixed allocations.
Finally, changing a formal treaty regime to
accommodate new technologies and policies can prove
difficult. Signatories rarely modify a treaty once it has
entered into force. Negotiating sides often see last-
minute changes or revisions as (a) obstacles to
successful treaty completion, or (b) attempts by one
side or the other to obscure or delay implementation.
Surmounting this hurdle requires treaty language that
stipulates procedures for incorporating new
technologies as they become available. Such language
permits a mechanism for review and adoption of new
technologies.
Technology
Various tools and technologies from arms-control
regimes would transfer well to water treaties. Advances
in technology (such as remote sensing) originally used
in arms control can now aid in non-military
applications, including hydrologic monitoring. Such
technology is likely to play a more significant role in
future cooperative water-resource agreements. Water-
related information portrayed and/or derived from
satellite imagery includes (but is not limited to) the
following: topographic data, evapotranspiration, land
use/cover, water distribution/flow, and snow pack
(Perry & Kite, 1999; Schultz, 2000). For example, when
Wolf et al. (1999) recomputed the numbers and extent
of internationally-shared r iver basins, they used
recently declassified digital elevation maps obtained
from several countries’ military satellite archives.
The complete spatial coverage provided by satellite
imagery is especially important in view of the current
use of point data to model or portray entire catchment
areas (Schultz, 2000). The potential to obtain complete
spatial coverage is particularly cr itical in those
developing countr ies with less-systematic data
collection and monitoring. Political sensitivity relating
to information sharing also emphasizes the potential
role of remotely-sensed data in both international
water negotiations (Perry & Kite, 1999) and arms-
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control treaty ver ification. Given the role that
information often plays in negotiations, the perceived
objectivity of remotely-sensed imagery may prove
critical in dispute resolution.
Moreover, the “real-world” visualization of
information provided by satellite imagery may also
be valuable in the context of negotiations. While access
to new technologies and data cannot replace the
political goodwill necessary for creative solutions, user-
friendly 21st-century technology (such as water-systems
Structure of Negotiations
A variety of (a) formal agreements, (b) informal
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and verbal
agreements, (c) Cooperative Threat Reduction
arrangements, and (d) lab-to-lab partnerships can
function to diffuse tensions over both arms-control
and water-management issues. These mechanisms can
be bilateral or multilateral—though as issues become
more comprehensive, more parties may find it in their
interest to participate. Additionally, both formal and
In the absence of detailed water law, adequate institutional capacity, or
warfare, the countries that contain or border the world’s
international waterways have managed to create remarkably
cooperative water institutions.
models, remotely-sensed data, and geographic
information systems) can assist in the process of
negotiating and managing international water-resource
systems. In addition, the negotiating sides should make
an effort to develop technologies and procedures
cooperatively, so that each party has a stake in their
deployment and use. Sensitive data should be kept in
a secured place to minimize the risk of unnecessary
information leakage, and all data gathered for treaty
purposes should be accounted for so as to allay
suspicion as to uses of “unused” data.
TREATIES AND INSTITUTIONS
Summary
Both arms control and water utilize a number of
regime structures, from bilateral informal partnerships
to formal multilateral treaties. By addressing issues of
informational equity and reciprocity and providing
significant benefits for participation, negotiating parties
can overcome historical mistrust and make progress
on critical issues. With the exception of bilateral arms-
control treaties between the United States and Russia,
both water and arms-control agreements involve
almost every country in the world. Arms control, at
least in the developed countries, usually benefits from
a well-developed bureaucratic and institutional
infrastructure that water regimes do not possess. In
addition, arms-control agreements benefit far more
from traditional national security funding than do
agreements on water resources.
informal negotiations succeed best when phased in
over time, allowing parties to build a history of
cooperation and mutual interests. Sometimes,
negotiations can utilize an existing institution (such as
the United Nations’ Conference on Disarmament).
The adjudicating institution may also proceed from
the negotiations. For example, the International Joint
Commission was established by the United States and
Canada under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty to
manage transboundary water issues.
Whatever the shape of the ar rangement,
collaboration over arms control or water resources
tends to precede either: (a) a problem that makes the
status quo unacceptable (such as naval confrontations
between the United States and U.S.S.R. that gave rise
to the Incidents at Sea Agreement); or (b) an opportunity
(such as the decision by the United States to destroy
all its chemical weapons, motivating that country to
bind others to do the same). For example, a drought
can bring countries to the table to negotiate an
agreement to prevent or alleviate future water crises.
In the early 1940s, negotiations over the Colorado
River between the United States and Mexico were
accelerated due to both water shortages in Mexico
and President Roosevelt’s desire to improve relations
with that country during World War II.
In order to share often-sensitive information about
water supply or arms capability, each country must
see a benefit to participating in an agreement. However,
each country’s emphasis on its individual sovereignty
often presents a bar r ier to data shar ing and
information exchange. By (a) addressing issues of
informational equity and reciprocity directly, and (b)
providing significant benefits for participation, parties
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can overcome historical mistrust and make progress
on critical issues. Lack of data sharing was an historical
barrier between India and Bangladesh in their dispute
over the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges River; and
their recent formal agreement explicitly calls for
exchanges of hydrologic information.
Defining Success
Finally, when parties reach agreement and set up
an implementing body, both water resources and arms
control can benefit from a clear definition of “success.”
Some treaties can be declared a success (even in the
face of subsequent “technical” violations) because the
affected parties negotiated the agreement instead of
going to war over the issue. Sometimes the success of
a treaty depends on efforts and activities over time
rather than on single measures of success. In either
case, the development and application of performance
criteria can aid in determining the “success” of a treaty
or agreement, which can ultimately improve the
efficacy of treaties in the future.
Funding
Arms control falls within traditional notions of
national security; as such, it is usually very well-funded
by governments. But conflicts over water resources—
indeed the whole idea of environmental resources and
their security implications—fall outside traditional
notions of “national secur ity.” Because many
governments (including that of the United States) have
been slow to recognize this “soft” aspect of security,
water-resource agreements and negotiations have not
been well funded in comparison with “hard” security
topics such as arms control. In some instances,
international organizations (rather than the countries
directly involved) fund water security activities. The
ongoing Nile Basin Initiative, for example, is funded
by the United Nations Development Programme, the
World Bank, the FAO, Canadian International
Development Agency, and the Italian government.2
Questions for Further Discussion
The workshop raised a variety of other questions.
How do crises become opportunities for negotiation
between states?  What will bring states to the table to
negotiate? How are such a crisis and its attendant
negotiations precipitated? Does it require the
intervention of an individual to br ing about an
agreement (such as with Jodi Lynn Williams and the
international ban on land mines)?  Or are agreements
more likely to be precipitated when the public
demands action (such as when the discovery of
significant amounts of strontium-90 in children’s teeth
in the 1950s led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of
1963)? More specifically, since water is a global
resource, should there be a global cooperative water-
monitoring agreement? Is this politically possible?
Could an international cooperative monitor ing
program overcome national sovereignty and data
secrecy issues, and if so, how? What would be sufficient
incentives for countries to cooperate? These questions
and others could be the focus of additional work and
discussion.
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Summary
While both water and arms control benefit from
public input, the arms-control arena offers fewer
opportunities for such input. In addition, public input
to reduce both arms and large-scale water-
development projects may meet some resistance from
governments and other entrenched interests. All forms
of agreements can benefit from confidence-building
measures, increased transparency, and citizen
involvement in verification (if applicable).
Public and NGO Participation
Traditionally, “experts” have negotiated arms
control and nonproliferation treaties on behalf of
national governments and with relatively little input
from the general population. Several factors may have
influenced this situation. The regulated or controlled
items have generally been military activities and
weapons. Government agencies “own” these items and
activities. In recent years, treaties like the CWC also
regulate material and activities of the private sector.
In the case of the CWC, representatives of the chemical
industry had a significant though indirect effect on
the agreed verification measures. For treaties that
concern limiting military equipment and activities, the
defense industry can influence decisions through
lobbying and other congressional testimony. Water
issues also have come under their fair share of lobbying.
The recent report from the World Commission on
Dams (WCD, 2000) was influenced by representatives
from both the dam construction industry and the
environmental community. Both sides have challenged
its conclusions as biased (Cushing, 2002; Patrick
McCully, personal communication, March 1, 2002).
Both arms control and water-resource
management have experienced an increase in public
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attention and involvement in decision-making activities
in the last few decades—particularly facilitated by a
global increase in the numbers of NGOs. For example,
NGOs such as the National Resources Defense
Council and the Pugwash Conferences have sought
to give citizens a voice in matters of nuclear war.
Given the political and military secrecy involved
in most arms-control negotiations (as well as the
greater role that the public plays in water management
as water-users), the water field has more public input
than arms control does. The water field contains an
impressive range of NGOs—from the World Water
increases the number of stakeholders with economic
interests in the field. These “entrenched interests” are
often resistant to new methods and policies.
Moving Forward
There are several trends in arms control and
nonproliferation that may change both
implementation and the degree of citizen involvement.
• Confidence-building measures, designed to reassure
neighbors and the international community that a
country is not a threat, need not be legally binding.
The difficulty of ratifying arms-control treaties in the U.S. Senate
reflects in part a lack of broad public participation in their design.
Council and the Global Water Partnership (whose
members include government water agencies, utilities,
and private water providers) to the Freshwater Action
Network (whose members are other environmental
NGOs) to the International Water Resources
Association and the International Water Association
(which are professional organizations of scientists,
engineers, and other water specialists). These
organizations can help funnel public input into official
government-level negotiations. As arms-control treaties
evolve to address issues such as land mines and small
arms—weapons that more directly affect the public—
public input will likely rise.
Entrenched Interests
Measuring the input that public citizens should
or could have on the formation and execution of policy
in the areas of both water management and arms
control is complicated by several factors. Both the
development and accumulation of powerful weapons
such as nuclear warheads and the construction of large-
scale water-diversion projects such as dams carry a
certain symbolism. Both require a government capable
of a certain outlay of wealth and technological prowess;
therefore, such symbolic actions might signal both to
other nations and to its own citizens that this nation is
now a world power, a state to be reckoned with. Such
symbolic acts might also fuel either an arms race or a
development spree. In addition, the more prestige
these fields can garner, the more likely they are to
develop an exclusive cadre of persons that
institutionalize the field’s knowledge and viewpoint.
Such institutionalization is often accompanied by the
establishment of large-scale industries and jobs, which
These measures could include notification of
military exercises, invitations to observe military
exercises or facilities, and establishing hotlines.
• Unilateral measures and increased transparency could be
loosely coordinated among countries to avoid
lengthy, costly, and contentious negotiations about
verification measures. Such an approach could
hasten weapons reductions and preserve flexibility.
• Treaties limiting small arms and other destructive equipment
such as the Land Mines Treaty have a much greater
immediate impact on ordinary citizens than do
treaties limiting nuclear weapons (Land Mine Treaty,
1997). They are also much more difficult to verify.
Citizen involvement in treaty initiation, negotiation,
and verification could be critical to the success of
such treaties.
Non-Treaty Mechanisms
Water-resources management treaties can be
supplemented by a number of non-treaty mechanisms
such as cultural festivals, sister watersheds, and trade
agreements. People everywhere enjoy celebrating their
local water resources, and water festivals have sprung
up in venues as far flung as Stockholm, Sweden, and
Centerville, Alabama. The 3rd World Water Forum
planned for March 2003 in Kyoto, Japan will have an
associated “water fair” that is expected to bring over
100,000 visitors. A possible UNESCO program
promoting “sister watersheds” (similar to the now-
widespread sister-cities programs) would allow
communities to exchange information. All of these
types of activities add to local ownership of water-
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resources issues; if harnessed, they can also further
strengthen commitments to international agreements.
CONCLUSION
What have these two sides learned from one
another? With regard to scientific and technological
advancements, two things are clear: (1) the strength of
the arms-control community in the area of science
and technology, and (2) the need for such tools and
techniques in the water community. The heavy
emphasis on technology found in arms-control treaties
would translate well to water-resources treaties.
Remote sensing, satellite imagery, and real-time on-
line data collection and dissemination would be
extremely useful to determine water availability, flows,
diversions, and quality. For example, CMC participates
in a pilot project designed to monitor basic water-
quality parameters in Central Asian transboundary
watersheds. Begun in March 2000, the project aims at
“facilitating the development of scientific methodology
for cooperation and understanding of transboundary
resource issues. This is a precursor to cooperative
transboundary natural resource management” (CMC,
2000). By facilitating regional scientific cooperation
and collaboration in these independent republics of
the former Soviet Union, CMC is helping improve
regional relationships and promote cooperation on
difficult issues that would enhance security and stability
in the contentious region of Central Asia.
Arms control again has much to offer with regard
to treaties and institutions, although the great number
and diversity of water agreements also provide useful
tools and concepts. The formalized structures of the
arms-control regime give the attendant treaties a high-
profile stability and permanence. Organizations such
as the (former) U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA) at the national level and the IAEA at
the international level have proven invaluable—both
to make sure that governments focus on particular
security issues and (in the case of the IAEA) to ensure
cooperation among nations facing the same issue. In
addition, these types of organizations serve a useful
purpose beyond merely fulfilling the functions of a
treaty. If the treaty were ever to become defunct, the
organization might still fulfill a useful role for
information exchange or as a starting point for further
negotiations.
The informality of water-resources regimes, on
the other hand, offers the flexibility to either: (a) use
existing organizations such as the World
Meteorological Organization to fulfill treaty functions,
thereby making successful treaty execution a less
daunting job; or (b) create organizations for specific
treaty obligations (such as the International Boundary
and Water Commission, designed to implement the
various treaties governing boundary waters between
the United States and Mexico). Another piece of
knowledge that could be transferred from water
regimes to arms control is that “treaties” themselves
might not always be the most useful mechanism to
resolve conflict or address an issue. Conflict-
management processes and other informal measures
may work to overcome mistrust between parties that
would otherwise be chary of signing a formal, binding
agreement.
With regard to social and cultural considerations,
experience in water negotiations is deeper and more
complex. Water-resources treaties have generally
attempted to incorporate public participation and
nongovernmental groups more directly in the
decision-making process. In a few progressive regional
cases, these treaties have adopted cooperative modeling
(i.e., including public input in forming assumptions
and building models). While most people are still
willing to leave technical fields such as arms control
to “experts,” many NGOs—armed with a greater level
of knowledge than ever before—are pressur ing
governments to display more transparency in these
negotiations. Including opportunities for public
participation or adopting cooperative modeling may
satisfy these demands while permitting negotiations
to go forward.
In addition, water-resources projects have
increasingly been required to compensate those
displaced by dams or affected by poor water quality.
Financial compensation for the negative ecological and
public-health impacts of weapons testing and other
weapons development is less widespread. But non-
financial public compensation techniques such as
ecological remediation could be transferred to the
arms-control regime in response to increased public
acknowledgement of the environmental and public-
health damage from security projects (such as the
nuclear weapons production sites at Hanford, WA or
Rocky Flats, CO).
We also note two key differences between the two
regimes. First, the water-resources regime receives
input from many different and often conflicting
interests such as agriculture, domestic ratepayers,
industry, and ecosystem users. These conflicting interests
may make negotiating international water agreements
more difficult, since each country might not have a
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unified position on water issues. While the plethora
of voices is a challenge for developing a comprehensive
multilateral water agreement, it can also make the final
result more robust and palatable. The difficulty of
ratifying arms-control treaties in the U.S. Senate reflects
in part a lack of broad public participation in their
design.
Second, though industr ial development can
augment a country’s biological or chemical production
ability, arms-control agreements generally concern
static baseline numbers of weapons or capabilities that
are limited by the treaty. As such, they can be verified
through inspection. Water agreements, on the other
hand, may be predicated upon measuring the yearly
supply of water in a given watershed, or water quality
at specific locations or times. These factors can fluctuate
dramatically on a yearly scale because of climatic
conditions, or on a longer time scale because of
anthropomorphic activity. If such a treaty is to function
in reality, its definitions and verification procedures
must take this variability into account.
The unusual comparison of these two seemingly
disparate fields reveals many similarities and useful
lessons. Comparing other such disparate fields (such
as water resources and energy, arms control and food,
or arms control and climate change) might offer other
lessons of value to help us meet our goals of both
national security and environmental protection.
The authors would like to thank Amy Sands of the Monterey Institute for International Studies and Patrick McCully from
the International Rivers Network for useful discussion, and Steve Del Rosso of the Carnegie Corporation of New York
for lending his participation to this unusual project.
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